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Keane v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp.: RECOVERY UNDER
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
ALLOWED WHERE CHILD
HAS NOT REACHED HIS
TWENTY-SECOND BIRTHDAY
In Keane v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp., 70 Md. App. 298, 520 A.2d 1142
( 1987), a case of first impression, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland allowed recovery under Maryland's Wrongful Death
Statute to the parents of a child who had
passed his twenty-first (21st) birthday but
had not reached his twenty-second (22nd).
Gregory Keane, son of Michael E.
Keane and Catherine Patricia Keane, was
killed in an automobile accident caused by
the negligence of Carolina Freight Carriers
Corporation (Carolina). At the time ofhis
death Gregory was 21 years, 7 months,
and 28 days old.
The jury returned verdicts in favor of
the Keanes for mental anguish and emotional pain and suffering. Carolina made a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the
· verdict, based on the theory that Gregory
was too old to permit his parents recovery
under the Wrongful Death Statute. The
trial court granted the motion and the
Keanes appealed.
The Maryland Wrongful Death Statute
provides in pertinent part:
Damages zf unmarried child, who is not
minor, dies. -For the death of an unmarried child, who is not a minor child,
the damages awarded under subsection (c) are not limited or restricted by
the "pecuniary loss" or "pecuniary
benefit" rule but may include damages
for mental anguish, emotional pain and
suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, care, attention, advice, counsel, training or guidance where applicable if:
( 1) The child is 21 years old or younger;
or
(2) A parent contributed 50 percent or
more of the child's support.
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. Section
3-904(e) (1984).

The court of special appeals disagreed
with the trial court's interpretation of the
statutory construction of the Wrongful
Death Statute. "[T]he cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to effectuate the actual intention of the legislature." Keane, at
301, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438, 374 A.2d
34 7 ( 1977) ). In determining the legislative
intent the court looked to the language of
the statute itself. When the language of the
statute is plain and clear the court will give
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effect to the statute as it stands. In addition, "[r]esults that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense
should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language." /d. at
302, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438-39, 374
A.2d 347 (1977)).
The trial court based their interpretation
of the statute on a line of criminal cases
and held that since Gregory Keane had
passed his twenty-first (21st) birthday the
Keanes could not recover under the statute.
In so doing, the court erred in that criminal
cases apply a different set of rules of statutory construction than civil cases, those
being strict construction in favor of the defendant. In addition, there were numerous
civil cases on point which the court could
have looked to for authority.
The court of special appeals determined
that since the statute specifically stated it
covered a child who is not a minor, it was
"obvious that the legislature intended to
permit recovery for the death of certain
unmarried adult children." /d. at 302,
520 A.2d at 1144. Carolina argued that
recovery was limited to children under
twenty-one (21) since the legislature had
used the age of twenty-one (21) in granting
rights to individuals in the past, such as
the right to buy liquor. The court rejected
this argument because "the clear purpose
of the statute was to compensate the parents of certain unmarried non-minor children even though the children themselves
are given no legal rights." ld. at 304, 520
A.2d at 1145.
In looking at the language of the statute, the trial court thought that the phrase
"21 years old or younger" should be interpreted as a single entity. The court of special appeals concluded that the word "or"
was a "disjunctive conjunction [which]
serves to establish a relationship of contrast
or opposition," and does not alter or limit
the meaning of the phrase "21 years old."
/d. at 302, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting In
Re John R., 41 Md. App. 22, 25, 394 A.2d
818 (1978)).
The task then turned to defining what
was meant by the term "21 years old." The
court found that the term had a common
and ordinary meaning. That being; a person is thought of as being a certain age until
he reaches his next birthday. E.g., Covell v.
State, 143 Tenn. 571,227 S.W. 41 (1921);
People v. Cooper, 207 Misc. 845, 143
N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (1955). Since Gregory
Keane had not reached his twenty-second
(22nd) birthday the court ruled he was still
twenty-one (21) years old under the plain
and clear meaning of the phrase when he
was killed.
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-

land in interpreting Maryland's Wrongful
Death Statute looked to the legislative intent and the plain and clear meaning of the
statute. Keane makes it clear that parents
of a non-minor child who has passed his
twenty-first (21st) birthday but has not
reached his twenty-second (22nd) birthday
is considered to be twenty-one (21) years
old, and the parents may recover for emotional pain and suffering under the Wrongful Death Statute.
-Adam J. Seve/

Colorado v. Bertine: AUTOMOBILE
INVENTORY EXCEPTION TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
WARRANT RULE
In Colorado v. Bertine, 475 U.S. __,
107 S. Ct. 738 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court held that police officers
may open closed containers while conducting a routine inventory search of an
impounded vehicle.
A Boulder City police officer arrested
Steve Bertine for driving while under the
influence of alcohol. After Bertine was
taken into custody and before a tow truck
arrived to take the car to an impoundment
lot, another officer conducted an inventory
search of the van's contents. Directly behind the front seat, the officer found a
backpack. Inside the backpack the officer
discovered various containers holding controlled substances, cocaine paraphernalia
and a large amount of cash. After the inventory was conducted, the van was towed
to an impoundment lot and the contraband was taken to the station. At that time
Bertine was charged with unlawful possession of cocaine with the intent to dispense,
sell and distribute, unlawful possession of
methaqualone and driving while under the
influence.
Prior to his charges on the drug offenses,
Bertine moved to suppress the evidence
found during the inventory search on the
ground that the search of the closed backpack and containers exceeded the permissible scope of a search under the Fourth
Amendment. The state trial court determined that the search did not violate Hertine's right under the Fourth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution. However, the
court did grant Bertine's motion to suppress, holding that the inventory search
violated the United States Constitution.
On the State's interlocutory appeal, the
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed but
premised its ruling on the United States
Constitution. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979), United States v. Chadwick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977).
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Colorado court's decision holding that the

